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Behavioral economics changed the way we think about market participants and revolutionized
policy-making by introducing the concept of choice architecture. However, even though effective on
the level of a population, interventions from behavioral economics, nudges, are often characterized by
weak generalisation as they struggle on the level of individuals. Recent developments in data science,
artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have shown ability to alleviate some of the
problems of weak generalisation by providing tools and methods that result in models with stronger
predictive power. This paper aims to describe how ML and AI can work with behavioral economics
to support and augment decision-making and inform policy decisions by designing personalized
interventions, assuming that enough personalized traits and psychological variables can be sampled.
I. INTRODUCTION
Incentives of economic agents lie in the center of eco-
nomic reasoning, decision-making and policy-making [1].
In fact, policy makers use the latest advancements in the
understanding of incentives to design economic interven-
tions in order to create a positive impact on the soci-
ety. They often use one-size-fits-all solutions that provide
very weak generalizations [2–4]. Yet, economic interven-
tions should be more effective by employing personalized
incentives, i.e., on the level of individual members of the
population [5].
The predictive power of policies based on economic
theories that assume fully rational self-interested individ-
uals vary broadly because humans often fail to behave
like the fully rational homo economicus [6, 7]. In fact,
human behavior and decisions deviate [8] from those of
rational agents due to a multitude of psychological, cog-
nitive, emotional, cultural, and social factors [9–12].
By exploiting these factors and selecting interventions
to align incentives with certain objectives, policy mak-
ers can provide prescriptions to shape people’s behav-
ior [13] based on research in psychology and behavioral
economics [7, 14]. Choice architecture, the background
against which people make choices, can include subtle
nudges (hints, reminders or warnings) to drive human
behavior toward ”desired” actions while preserving the
availability of choice through people’s agency and con-
trol [15]. Indeed, choice architecture has been success-
fully applied by policymakers [16–19] targeting groups of
people with certain commonalities [20, 21] resulting in
numerous positive health care [22], economic, and soci-
etal outcomes [5, 23].
Nudging doesn’t work very well on the level of individ-
uals because of the poor generalisation of the economic
incentives and the designed nudges. While the new poli-
cies result in a positive outcome on average (i.e., at the
level of population), it is often not possible to tell whether
and how effective they are for specific individuals.
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Nudging a human collective on the level of individual
members needs a different approach. Instead of asking
how a particular nudge influences the behavior of a group
of people we want the answer to a question how a par-
ticular individual would respond to a particular nudge
given that individual’s circumstances.
We can’t simply ”brute-force” an outcome by trying
many different policies on a population - this may still,
on average, provide the same outcome by modifying the
choices of a different sub-population. Neither can we
provide a separate policy for each individual in society
because of limited workforce and massive costs of such
an undertaking.
What we need instead is a generalized model, which,
when applied to each individual separately based on each
individual’s unique circumstances and context, will pro-
vide a prediction for most suitable personalized response
that would yield the desired outcome.
Prediction methods that generalize and scale over large
heterogeneous populations are being developed within
the fields of data science, artificial intelligence, and ma-
chine learning.
The field of artificial intelligence (AI) concerns with the
design and engineering of artificial, autonomous, rational
agents [24, 25] that can learn, make predictions and de-
cisions, and improve them without human intervention.
Machine learning (ML), a subset of AI, centers on itera-
tively learning algorithms in order to obtain generalized
models which describe, often hidden, relationships within
and between datasets [26, 27]. The obtained models are
then tested against known outcomes, and, if satisfactory,
are used to make predictions on out-of-sample data. The
models are improved with each new input-output query
through the application of appropriate feedback to the
model-generating algorithm.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning originated
in the middle of last century [28, 29] and have seen a
resurgence in popularity in recent years primarily driven
by the availability of data [30], reduced computing costs,
and progress in mathematical algorithms [31–33]. Impor-
tantly, making predictions became affordable; simple ML
models can be trained and deployed on a personal laptop.
2Moreover, complex ML algorithms requiring dedicated
hardware are well within reach of most corporations and
organizations.
The applications of machine learning range from nat-
ural language processing [34], medical diagnostics [35],
predictive business analytics [31, 36, 37], persuasion pro-
filing [38] to predicting crime and recidivism [39, 40], and
distributions of wealth [41–43], among many others [44].
Machine learning and AI are used in the development of
autonomous self-driving cars which continuously scan the
surroundings using cameras and sensors, identify objects
and patterns in the data they collect, predict behaviors
of traffic participants and make decisions based on these
predictions; all without human intervention [45, 46].
In banking and finance, machine learning is used for
credit-scoring, predicting customer attrition, facilitating
loan decisions [47], trading [48, 49], advisory, and cus-
tomer service, among others [50]. Applying ML to finan-
cial predictions allows for the detection of interactions in
the data that are invisible to existing financial economic
theories [51].
Machine learning has been recently applied in the fields
of economics [25, 37, 52], psychology [53] as well as phys-
ical and chemical sciences aiding and accelerating discov-
ery of new materials [54–56], finding hidden patterns in
large datasets [57–59], and planning chemical synthesis
[60]. In future, AI and ML will, at least to some degree,
replace parts of the scientific discovery and innovation
processes through automation and unsupervised learning
[61].
In short, ML can find previously obscured nonlinear
patterns in data and use that to make more accurate
predictions in various fields. In the next section, we focus
on its ability to predict human behavior.
II. FROM PREDICTION MACHINES TO
CHOICE ARCHITECTURE MACHINES
We can use the machine learning toolbox to signifi-
cantly improve human decision making [62, 63] and im-
prove our ability to predict what person will respond to
what persuasive technique [40, 64–69]. However, even
when using predictions obtained from ML methods users
still have to form their own judgement [70]. In this con-
text, ML may augment users’ decision-making process by
providing possible solutions, which they may have missed
otherwise. In contrast to computers, peoples’ ability to
process thousands of variables in a short time is limited
and depends on their emotional state. ML reduces the
time it takes to make a decision and the cognitive cost of
judgement [63]. ML can therefore prompt to reconsider
previously made decisions and to carefully reevaluate the
possible outcomes.
III. GENERAL FORMULATION
We present a general formulation of the problem where
a decision of the choice of a personalized intervention is
augmented by a prediction using machine learning mod-
els.
Assume G to be the utility describing an a priori spec-
ified goal [71]. Let GΩ(Nu) be the total utility of our
decision, made over a populations Ω, to apply nudge Nu
selected from a set of nudges N , where u = 0, ..., l and
N0 means no nudging. By selecting only one nudge that
would selectively influence a subset of Ω, utility GΩ may
be very far from its maximum value. If we change Nu we
obtain a different GΩ. We may however not know how
different Nu affects individual members of the popula-
tion.
Consider that the outcomes of our decisions can be
evaluated at the level of individuals. To maximize out-
come GΩ for a problem P , we adopt a personalized in-
tervention approach, where for every person ωi ∈ Ω,
i = 1, ..., n , we can assign Nu, such that we maximize
the utility Gωi(δu
i
), where δu
i
is a decision to use a nudge
Nu for person i.
To obtain a prediction model, for each ωi we assemble
a feature vector Πi, which contains a set of informative
variables, traits, pik ∈ Π, where k = 1, ...,m denotes the
individual variable in the set, to which we add a variable
pim+1 = Nu corresponding to a particular nudge, and an
outcome variable yi : {0, 1}, i.e., we assign ”1” or ”0”
depending on whether the nudge worked for a particular
person or did not, respectively. The prediction model, or
hypothesis, is obtained by supervised learning by training
on an experimentally obtained dataset consisting of many
input-output pairs (Πi ∪ {Nu} , yi).
Predicting best δu
i
for people which were not in the
training set is then made by estimating the probabilities
P (yi = Nu | Πi). Our decision can then be defined as
δui = argmax
u
P (yi = Nu | Πi) (1)
To maximize the total utility we need to sum over all
the individual utilities Gωi(δu
i
):
maxGΩ =
n∑
i=1
Gωi(δu
i
) (2)
Applying a particular nudge incurs costs. These costs
are summative - if more nudges are applied, the cost is
the sum of the cost of individual nudges. The payout of
nudges is commutative, i.e., it doesn’t matter in which se-
quence they are applied, however it is also non-associative
(applying two nudges in sequence may not be the same as
applying two at the same time). Applying more nudges
then necessary for a single individual at the same time
will therefore have diminishing returns.
The question is then whether applying personalized
nudges is always better than doing nothing, i.e., whether
3a wrongly prescribed nudge can be worse than no nudging
and whether there are externalities [71, 72].
Not nudging is included in the set N . The model may
predict that we will be better off without prescribing any
intervention, i.e., P (N0 | Πi) will be larger than for any
other nudge. We can also run into a situation where
the probabilities for every outcome will be very low. In
this case we may wish to estimate a cut-off probability
below which we would default to not nudging [70]. This
cut-off may be related to the cost of nudging and may
be important at the early stages of model deployment
when the model may give poor predictions. Of note is
that personalized nudging may at the end significantly
cut cost by avoiding wrongly prescribed, or effectively
ineffective, nudges.
Finally, we need to evaluate whether the utility of per-
sonalized nudging is higher or equal than the utility of
the one-nudge-for-all approach for every possible nudge.
∀Nu ∈ N,G
Ω(Nu) 6 G
Ω(δu) (3)
Such situation may occur as the ML models are not
100% accurate and can assign wrong nudges en masse,
especially at the early stages of model employment in-
creasing the cost, compromising fairness and drastically
decreasing the total utility of personalized predictions.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
A. Populations and feature selection
The populations over which choice architects would
want to make personalized decisions are usually not ran-
domly selected, but depend on the problem that needs
to be solved. For example, post treatment compliance in
diabetics will necessarily reduce the population to people
that are already sick and with traits uniquely character-
izing them, such as, perhaps, a sedentary life style. The
designed set of nudges N will therefore be biased and de-
pend on the sample. There is however enormous amount
of research data from behavioural studies available that
could provide a meaningful hint which variables may be
relevant [23]. To deeply understand which nudges should
be included into N , choice architects need to better un-
derstand the problem by running interviews with prac-
titioners and reviewing literature describing results from
single nudges. Such approach will also help in feature
selection. Identifying and removing co-linear variables
through feature selection is essential to minimize overfit-
ting.
Random forests algorithms [73] bootstrap subsamples
of predictors and handle many predictors at once while
minimizing overfitting. At the same time, they are sen-
sitive to nonlinear relationships and to complex inter-
actions between predictors. However, unlike single re-
gression trees where the relationship between the data
is much clearer, random forest algorithms are harder to
interpret. Transparent and easily communicable algo-
rithms may take preference in personalized prediction of
human behavior due to ethical considerations even at the
expense of the overall intervention cost due to less accu-
rate predictive models.
The complexity of human traits and human behavior
may generate numerous outliers in datasets. However,
these outliers should not be removed in personalized in-
terventions, since choice architects prefer to provide a
solution for everyone. Choice architects need to account
for them in order to design models that will not only
work for the centre of the distributions.
Using preregistration, akin to the one used in clinical
trials and psychology, will make the experiments more
transparent, less prone to error, and easier to reproduce
[74, 75]. Preregistration may include the methods and
predictors that will be used to train the ML models.
Reinforcement Learning is a machine learning method
that helps an agent learn from experience by maximizing
a cumulative reward. Although reinforcement learning
doesn’t need much historical data in advance it can take
long time to learn. It could be used to complement in-
dividualized response models with learning from popula-
tion outcomes. However, it needs to be deployed for the
learning to start. In this case, one needs to carefully eval-
uate the cost of wrongly prescribed nudges. If the cost is
high, bootstrapping the models with available literature
data may be advantageous.
B. Model performance testing
Evaluation metrics such as accuracy, confusion matrix,
logarithmic loss, or F-score which includes precision and
recall, and their modifications, are often used to evaluate
classification models on out-of-sample datasets. In con-
text of decisions that affect people directly, the choice of
performance metrics to optimize depends however on the
problem we try to solve and on our measure of fairness
[76–78]. The later needs to ideally be defined a priori.
Different stakeholders may see the usefulness of the met-
rics differently, but, in context of nudges, support for
human values should take priority to mathematical cor-
rectness. The metrics also may assume that the test set is
representative of the underlying real world task and that
the model’s logic is free of errors, i.e., that the model is
neither accurate for the wrong reasons [79] nor oversen-
sitive to certain details.
In practice we may wish to evaluate the model per-
formance at the level of the population, groups with the
same interventions allocated, and on the level of individ-
uals to see whether predictive value parity takes undue
precedence over other metrics [77, 80]. Accuracy alone
will therefore seldom be the right evaluation metrics.
A crucial aspect of using ML models for predictions is
to continuously improve their performance in a ”learning-
by-using” fashion. In some cases, this can be achieved
4via interviews. It would be advantageous to know why
certain nudge did not work to eliminate the likelihood of
anomalies entering the model learning loop.
While the model is deployed, one should also contin-
uously test its efficacy due to numerous reasons. The
first reason is model decay causing the model to slowly
drift towards less generalized solutions. This can be due
to concept drift, i.e., changes how we interpret the data,
but also due to previously unseen variety of data and dif-
ferences in the meaning of labels which may cause a shift
of decision boundaries. The second reason is nudge creep,
i.e., the idea that people who are nudged and aware of
it will adapt their behavior neutralizing the effect of the
nudge. The third reason is the efficacy of the nudge. For
example, weight loss incentives may work only for obese
people with a particular lifestyle or eating habits. If the
nudge worked and the person actually lost weight, pre-
sumably due to a change in lifestyle or eating habits, the
same nudge applied again for the same person may be
much less effective. Finally, it would be important to
collect and include personal historical data for improved
model training.
V. CHALLENGES
A. Data availability and augmentation
The success of applying machine learning approaches
hinges on the availability of reliable and bias-free data
which contain informative variables. Depending on the
ML task, the amount of required data can range from
hundreds to millions of records. To ascertain outcomes
with confidence, typically large scale and high resolution
data is needed. The necessary dimensionality of the re-
quired data to make personalized prediction is however
not entirely known. Increase in data dimensionality does
not automatically result in better predictions and some
conceptual insight into which variables would be most
predictive is necessary [81].
Some data are already available to different stakehold-
ers - for example, socioeconomic data [30] to the public,
food purchases [82] to stores, medical prescription records
to doctors, healthcare records to hospitals, etc.
Randomized control trials, where subjects are ran-
domly allocated different intervention and there is one
control group that has not been nudged have been widely
used to devise best nudging strategy. The data from
these studies, if publicly available, would be ideal for the
personalized intervention as described here [5]. The tri-
als come with their own set of challenges and biases that
need to be evaluated [83]. Alternatively survey data can
be used as well.
If available data is limited and its use results in mod-
els with low predictive power, one may also consider data
augmentation. In data augmentation small variations to
the existing dataset are introduced through data manip-
ulation. For example, distorting, or adding noise to a
picture have been shown to overall help obtaining bet-
ter image recognition models. Although such approach
works very well for some tasks such as image recognition,
applying data augmentation to describe human behavior
is not straightforward. It is not clear which features, and
to what extent, could be manipulated and whether such
manipulation is free from ethical concerns. Application
of data augmentation to machine learning problems that
analyze human behavior and provide a basis for decision
making that is expected to impact people directly clearly
warrants consideration and careful research studies.
B. Ethics of AI, model interpretability and
unintended consequences
Measures of fairness of ML algorithms and resulting
models are intensively debated and understanding the
trade-offs associated with each employed measure is cru-
cial for making informed decisions [84, 85]. Applica-
tion of machine learning algorithms to data that is fi-
nite and inherently biased may amplify the discrimina-
tory biases [71, 86] mirroring the societal stereotypes.
Removing these biases from the data may be arduous,
and workarounds would need to be devised [87, 88] if we
want to have a technology that will move us to a more
equitable society for all [89]. Nondiscrimination and re-
spect for fundamental human rights must be preserved
through the preservation of agency and control regard-
less of incentives and economic forces - we should be free
from unwanted manipulation and able to exercise our free
will at all times [20].
Jon Kleinberg et al. [87, 90] showed that in some cases
data science and machine learning can, based on popu-
lations data, find behavioral-type variables that can be
used to identify biases and help predicting outcomes [87]
on the level of individuals. In other cases, we may need
to sacrifice utility to achieve higher fairness.
We need to interpret, understand, and explain the so-
lutions prescribed by ML models [39, 91–93] to ascertain
the consequences of misaligned incentives. Even if our
”black box” tool makes better predictions compared to
practitioners we still are responsible for the prediction’s
unintended consequences and minimizing harm should be
priority [94]. Frameworks like Local Interpretable Model-
Agnostic Explanations (LIME) [92] can provide insights
into how the machine learning models make decision in a
way that is readable for human non-experts. In context
of individualized recommendations, the main challenge
will be the availability of interpretable representations
of individualized predictions, instead of the entire model
behavior. This challenge needs to be addressed to keep
improving the models [95] and make them trustworthy
to the nudged subjects and the policymakers.
In context of personalized intervention, a wrongly pre-
scribed nudge must in general not be worse than no nudg-
ing at all - the counterfactual. Nudges should also be fair
- we should genuinely try to solve a problem regardless
5of people’s circumstances [71]. A tight collaboration be-
tween computer scientists and stakeholders with knowl-
edge about the problem may be needed to move beyond
simple predictions to causal inference [66, 72, 96] that
would allow to build better models. Due to cultural and
demographic variations, machines and machine decisions
may shape human behavior in unintended ways based
on where and how they are deployed creating new social
problems as a result [97].
A possible large negative impact of precision nudging
may be unethical influencing and harnessing of collective
behaviors by applying individualized impulses (nudges)
to a specific subset of a target population [98, 99]. This
could lead to swarm behavior similar to that observed in
animals [100], as well as herding behavior among humans
under specific conditions [101, 102]. To mitigate this, the
possibility of adversarial attacks on the machine learning
models would need to be researched and evaluated care-
fully [79, 103, 104] to prevent interference by third parties
with competing incentives.
VI. PRECISION NUDGING APPLICATIONS
It is important for experimental economists to ascer-
tain whether a behavior inside the laboratory is a good
indicator of behavior outside the laboratory [105–107].
Ultimately, one needs models that generalize well to the
real world [6]. In natural circumstances, a person’s be-
havior and decisions will be based on a complex com-
bination of personality traits and situational context.
Some nudges may even have adverse effect as has been
clearly demonstrated experimentally in the past [5]. In
fact, based on these findings it has been suggested that
population segmentation based on a single variable, such
as personal wealth, may already boost the efficiency of
certain interventions. Conversely, applying personalized
interventions based on predictions made by ML models
could increase the total utility of our decisions.
Below we list selected examples how precision nudging
may be applied. This list is definitely not exhaustive.
A. Mobile user behaviour
Microtargetting and allocating interventions has been
used in mobile applications for many years by following
each user behavior over time, including group behaviour
of users with certain commonalities [108]. Predicting
what the user may do next, interventions are typically ap-
plied even before the user makes a decision. This could
be pushed one step farther - by analyzing many users’
behavior the nudges could be selected with much better
precision [67].
B. Corporate policy
A large firm conducted field experiments to measure
the effect of prompts on influenza vaccination receipts
offered to its employees at free on-site clinics. The dis-
cerned prompts resulted in a statistically different vacci-
nation rates [109]. Machine learning could potentially be
used to predict which prompt would work best for which
employee and compare the ”precisely nudged” employee
vaccination rate to the control values obtained from the
study.
C. Nutrition
While the idea of an universal diet is being superseded
by personalized nutrition designed to induce individu-
alized response to food based on our genetic makeup,
physiology, habits, gut microbiome etc. [110], of equal
importance is to make sure that the prescribed food will
be actually consumed. To this end, personalized nudges
would need to be devised such that a subset of foods will
be consumed by a specific person. General nudging has
already been shown to work when targeting populations
dietary or health habits, but its effectiveness on the level
of individuals is rarely known.
D. Healthcare
The majority of hospital re-admissions after surgery
are due to non-adherence to discharge protocols. If the
patient does not adhere to the prescribed treatment out-
side the hospital, the overall medical intervention is seri-
ously compromised. Machine learning models that would
predict which precision nudges would most effectively
serve discharged patients would significantly reduce this
cost. Since readmission data are available, it is tempt-
ing to correlate different types of nudging employed by
different healthcare providers with the readmission rates
and see whether the patients’ data can provide clues on
the willingness of a particular patient to follow different
clinicians recommendations, i.e., the nudges.
To reduce healthcare cost, each person could be nudged
in a different way to adopt a set of health behaviors tai-
lored to their circumstances, place of residence, health
record, social conventions, and personal biases, among
other variables. The challenge is to find out which data
would provide the most meaning and which variables will
be a strong predictive feature for the machine learning
models to design the personalized nudge.
E. Conservationism
Nature conservationists want to utilize a behavioral
science toolkit to address unsolved complex wildlife con-
servation issues [111]. Conservation is a behavioral prob-
6lem and a catalogue of nudges drawn from behavioral eco-
nomics has been proposed, but not yet tested. Whether
the target behavior has been achieved using a particu-
lar nudge will be very hard to asses, but it can provide
a wealth of data for ML. As conservation is a complex
issue, nudging self-interested individuals may be a good
strategy.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Precision nudging is a new field of research that
combines behavioral economics principles with machine
learning and artificial intelligence methods. It will in-
fluence how we make decisions and how we design pub-
lic policies; it is libertarian paternalism [112, 113] taken
to extreme. Instead of looking for one-size-fits-all solu-
tions, one should look for models that generalize over
each and every member of the targeted population. Such
approach would likely need to rephrase the questions typ-
ically asked in choice architecture studies and would need
to rely on large and reliable datasets. Digitization of pub-
lic records and the ubiquity of data collection would help.
In some circumstances, surveys and experiments can be
designed to obtain appropriate data. As behaviour pre-
dicts behaviour, access to time dependent variables may
be very valuable. Personalized interventions may remove
biases inherent to our decision making. Combining ma-
chine learning with behavioral economics would allow
economists to run experiments and validate hypotheses
regardless of the underlying choice mechanism. Such ex-
periments should be background agnostic and tractable -
what is important is whether the machine learning mod-
els generalize well enough to provide for a personalized in-
tervention. If this can be achieved, precision nudging can
become a General Purpose Technology [114] that could
be applied to many problems we face today. If proven to
be widely effective, precision nudges will be adopted to
augment human decisions in workflows in policymaking,
finance, healthcare, education, and many other fields.
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